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FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX: CONCEPT
OF A TRANSFER
Henry J. Merry*

T

HE first of the "modern" federal death tax laws, enacted in I 9 I 6 1
"imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent" 2
a tax measured essentially by the net value of certain property interests at the time of his death.3 The tax was upheld as an indirect tax or
excise upon the privilege of transmitting property at death 4 and its
fundamental nature has never been changed.5 There has been, however,
an almost continuous controversy as to the property interests which
may and should be included in the basic measure of the tax-the gross
estate--and the present law embodies numerous amendments in this
respect. 6 The property interests included may be classified as (I) in-

* Member of the Illinois and Michigan bars; C.P.A., Illinois; A.B., LL.B.,
Michigan.-Ed.
1 Sept. 8, 1916, 39 Stat. L. 777-780, amended Mar. 3, 1917, 39 Stat. L. 1002,
and Oct. 3, 1917, 40 Stat. L. 324-325. Subsequent enactments: Feb. 24, 1919, 40
Stat. L. 1096-IIol; Nov. 23, 1921, 42 Stat. L. 277-284; June 2, 1924, 43 Stat.
L. 303-313; Feb. 26, 1926, 44 Stat. L. 69-87. The 1926 act was amended as follows: May 29, 1928, 45 Stat. L. 862-863; Mar. 3, 1931, 46 Stat. L. 1516-1517;
June 6, 1932, 47 Stat. L. 278-284; May 10, 1934, 48 Stat. L. 752-754; Aug. 30,
1935, 49 Stat. L. 1022-I023; June 22, 1936, 49 Stat. L. 1744-1745; May 28, 1938,
52 Stat. L. 564-565, 583. The 1926 act has now been superseded by an amended form:
Feb. 10, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 120-140, 26 U.S. C. A. (1939), §§ 810-931, amended
June 29, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 883. An additional enactment of June 6, 1932, 47 Stat. L.
243-245, was amended May IO, 1934, 48 Stat. L. 754-755; Aug. 30, 1935, 49 Stat.
L. 1021-1022; and May 28, 1938, 52 Stat. L. 564- It is now superseded in amended
form by the Act of Feb. 10, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 141-143, 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), §§
935-938.
2 39 Stat. L. 777 (1916).
3 "A tax ••• equal to the sum of the following percentages [rates] of the value of
the net estate••••" 39 Stat. L. 777 (1916). The net estate was defined as the gross
estate less certain allowances or deductions, 39 Stat. L. 778 (1916), and the value of
the gross estate includes "the value at the time of his death of all property'' to the
extent of various interests therein. 39 Stat. L. 777-778 (1916). Real property situated
outside the United States was not excepted untjl 1934. 48 Stat. L. 754. The option of
valuing the gross estate as of the date one year after the decedent's death was not
granted until 1935. 49 Stat. L. 1022-1023.
4 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 41 S. Ct. 506 (1921). Distinguished from an inheritance tax: Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis,
264 U. S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 291 (1924).
5 See statutes cited in note 1, supra. There have been substantial changes as to
rates, exemption and credits. See MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS
AND GIFI'S, 1938-39, pp. 156-157 (1938).
6 See Knouff, "Death Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivos," 36 M1cH. L.
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terests passing by will or the laws of succession 7 and ( 2) interests of
which the decedent for no valuable consideration made a transfer inter
vivos related in some manner to his death.8 The latter type of interests,
REv. 1284 (1938); Sutter and Owen, "Federal Taxation of Settlors of Trusts," 33
MxcH. L. REv. II69 (1935).
.
7 Property interests of the decedent at the time of his death, 53 Stat. L. 120
(1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § Su (a); dower and curtesy interests of the surviving spouse, 53 Stat. L. 120 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § 8II (b); property
passing under a general power of appointment executed by will, 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939),
26 U.S. C. A. (1939), § 811 (f).
8 ( 1) Transfers in contemplation of or taking effect at death.-Any property
interest "of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death,l*l or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom••••" 53 Stat. L.
121 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § Sn (c). The matter after the asterisk was
introduced in 1931 and 1932. 46 Stat. L. 1516 (1931), 47 Stat. L. 279 (1932).
The first part dates from 1916. 39 Stat. L. 777-778 (1916).
(2) Revocable transfers.-Any property interest "of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer ••• by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof
was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power
(in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or from what source the
decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any
such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death." 53 Stat, L. 121
(1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § Sn (d) (1). Transfers prior to June 22, 1936,
are not affected by the italicized matter. 53 Stat. L. 121 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A.
(1939), § 8II (d) (2). The subsection was first enacted in 1924, 43 Stat. L. 304
(1924). See historical note, 26 U. S. C. A. (1935), pp. 140-141.
(3) Joint interests.-The property interest "held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse,
or deposited, with any person carrying on the banking business, in their joint names
:md payable to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may be shown to
have originally belonged to such other person and never to have been received or
acquired by the latter from the decedent'' as a gift. 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939), 26
U. S. C. A. (1939), § 811 (e). In general the subsection dates from 1916. 39 Stat.
L. 778 (1916).
(4) Property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by deed
in a transaction comparable to those described in paragraphs (1) and (2) above. 53
Stat. L. 122 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § 8II (f).
(5) Proceeds of life insurance.-"the amount receivable by the executor as
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
e.~ent of the e.-.:cess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life." 53 Stat. L.
122 (1939), 26 U.S. C. A. (1939), § 8II (g). Not changed since being introduced
by the Revenue Act of 1918. 40 Stat. L. 1098 (1919).
The provisions quoted above in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) did not
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included in the gross estate in an effort to prevent tax avoidance,n
have precipitated most of the Supreme Court decisions in the estate tax
field,10 and as to the inclusion of these interests there has been "painfully developed" a "concept of a transfer" 11 which is unique.
The meaning of the word "transfer" has been influenced by the
fact that, while the statute indicates a single taxable event-the transfer
of the net estate--the courts have tended to find a transfer at death as
to each item of property included in the gross estate.12 In this regard
transfers in contemplation of death 13 are an exception, being related
to death only by way of motive.14 In all other instances there is at the
decedent's death the surrender of some interest, although such a general requirement is not explicit in the statute.1' 5 The statutory provision
concerning insurance 16 makes no mention of the status existing at death.
However, the inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross estate has
been upheld where the decedent at death possessed incidents of ownership in the policies, e.g., the power to change the beneficiary, because
in sueµ instance death brings about "the completion of that shifting of
the economic benefits of property which is the real subject of the tax." 17
On the other hand, inclusion of insurance has not been upheld where
at death the decedent lacked control of the policies or proceeds, because
"No interest passed to the beneficiary as the result of the death of the
apply to transferred property to the extent that the transfer was for "money or money's
worth." See 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939), 26 U.S. C. A. (1939), § 8II (i), and unquoted
portion of subsections noted in above paragraphs.
9 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 27-59 (1937). See infra at notes
14 and 44.
10 The question producing the greatest volume of litigation is that of valuation.
See index of valuation cases in HuGHES, THE FEDERAL DEATH TAX 323-386 (1938).
Undoubtedly a vast number of valuation disputes are compromised in treasury department procedure either alone or in conjunction with the settlement of other issues.
11 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 at 287, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
12 Some indication that the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the
taxable event is found in Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 at 542, 47 S. Ct. 710
(1927), and Heinerv. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 at 330, 52 S. Ct. 358 (1932). But
see United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 at 371, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939).
13 See note 8, supra, paragraph (I).
14 The inclusion was upheld as reasonably necessary to prevent tax avoidance.
Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 at 20, 51 S. Ct. 324 (1931). The classic
interpretation of the statutory phrase is found in United States v. Wells, 283 U. S.
102, 51 S. Ct. 446 (1931).
15 See note 8, supra.
16 See note 8, supra, paragraph (5).
17 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 at 338, 49 S. Ct. 126
(1929).
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insured." 18 In approving the inclusion of property held in joint tenancy 1 u ( meaning in this article any co-tenancy giving rights of survivorship to property formerly owned by the decedent), the Supreme
Court stated that "There was-at his death-a distinct shifting of economic interest, a decided change for the survivor's benefit." 20
The statutory provision embracing property interests "of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer . . • intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death" 21 has been
applied to a variety of situations (including some transfers in trust now
covered by a specific statutory provision 22) , but in each the decedent
possessed at his death some power or right reserved in a transfer inter
vivos. 23 The provision was at first limited to "interests passing from the
possession, enjoyment or control of the donor at his death." 2 ¼ Thus
it was applied in Reinecke v. Northern T1'ust Co.25 when the decedent
reserved in a trust the power to revoke for his own benefit and in
Porter v. Commissioner 26 when he reserved a power to modify a trust
except for his own benefit, but it was not applied in May v. Heiner 21
18 Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 2II at 219, 56 S. Ct. 180 (1935).
Cf. Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617, 30 F. Supp. 184, and
{Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778. See, generally, Paul, "Life Insurance and Federal
Estate Tax," 5z HARV. L. REv. 1037 (1939).
19 See note 8, supra, paragraph (3).
20 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 at 371, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939). See
2lso Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 at 503, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930); Phillips
, •• Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U. S. 160, 5z S. Ct. 46 (1931).
21 See note 8, supra, paragraph ( 1).
23 See note 8, supra, paragraph ( 2).
23 The Supreme Court has distinguished a power from a condition which the law
imposes, Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 at 97, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935), and a
power exercisable as trustee and one exercisable as settler, White v. Poor, 296 U. S.
98, 56 S. Ct. 55 (1935).
2 ¼ Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 at 348, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
The passing of "title or control" at death was expressed as a general requirement for
estate tax liability in Knox v. McEiligott, 258 U. S. 546 at 548-549, 4z S. Ct. 396
(1922).
26 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929). The case concerned seven trusts. The
taxable estate was held to include the corpus of two trusts revocable by the transferor,
but not to include the corpus of fh•e irrevocable trusts, even though the transferor
retained powers of management. In Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct.
554, a settler with trustee's powers was held liable for income tax on the income
of a short term trust. Cf. Helvering v. Wood, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 551.
211 288 U. S. 436 at 444, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933), stating, "the reservation •••
made the settler dominant. • • • His death terminated that control • • • and was, in
respect of title to the property in question, the source of valuable assurance passing
from the dead to the living."
~T 281 u. s. 238, 50 s. Ct. 286 (1930).
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when he reserved a life interest. As to the latter situation the Supreme
Court pointed out that the transfer inter vivas was "beyond recall" 28
and that the reserved interest of the decedent did not pass but was
obliterated at death.29 Similar reasoning was at first used where the
decedent at death had a contingent reversion conditioned upon his
surviving the donee,80 although a previous decision had held that where
such a reversion is vested the property is to be included in the gross
estate.81 Recently, however, the technical nature of the distinction between contingent aI].d vested reversions led the Supreme Court, in
Helvering v. Hallock, 82 to reverse its position as to the former.
Whether contingent or vested, reversions of this type, being conditioned
upon surviving the donee, have much in common with the joint tenant's right of survivorship.88 In the Hallock case the Court stated that
"The taxable event is a transfer inter vivos," 3 " but the general tenor of
the opinion is that the transferred property is to be included because
the transfer was not in substance complete until death.85
The statute has been expanded to cover specifically transfers with
a reservation of a power to revoke or to appoint, or a reservation of a
life interest, and in providing that such powers or rights must be possessed at death 86 the statute bears out the principle that the taxable
Ibid., 281 U. S. at 243.
Ibid.
so Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 at 43, 56 S. Ct. 74
(1935), stating "His death passed no interest'' but "simply put an end to what, at
best, was a mere possibility of a reverter by extinguishing it''; Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78 (1935).
31 Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398 (1931).
83 (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 444. The distinction is recognized without dispute as
to remainders. TREAS. REG. So, art. 13 (1937).
83 See dissenting opinion of Justice Stone in Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 296 U. S. 39 at 46, 56 S. Ct. 74 (1935). The Hallock case concerned situation-,
in which the donee v,as the wife. In Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra,
and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78 (1935), the
beneficiaries to be outlived were children. Tlie opinion in the Hallock case makes no
point of this distinction and the decision was followed in Bailey v. United States,
(Ct. CI. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778, where insurance proceeds would go to decedent's
estate if he survived his wife and child.
M Helvering v. Hallock, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 444 at 447.
85 The Court quoted from the dissenting opinion in Helvering v. St, Louis Union
Trost Co., 296 U. S. 39 at 47, 56 S. Ct. 72 (1935): "it would seem to be of no
consequence what particular conveyancers' device--what particular string-the decedent
selected to hold in suspense the ultimate disposition of his property until the moment
of his death. In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only at
death we look to substance, not to form." Helvering v. Hallock, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct.
444 at 449•
26 See note 8, supra, paragraphs ( 1) and ( 2).
28

29
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event is something occurring at death.87 The subsection dealing with
revocable trusts embraces instances in which the power is exercisable in
conjunction with another person,88 and where the other person is a
beneficiary 89 there is some ground for saying that the power really
gives no control over the property. The estate tax provision, however,
was upheld in Helvering v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Compan;y,"0
where the other person had a remainder interest in the income but was
also the husband of the grantor. The Supreme Court stated that "Congress may well have thought that a beneficiary who was of the grantor's
immediate family might be amenable to persuasion.•••" 41 Inasmuch as
the estate tax law does not reach trusts revocable or terminable solely
by another person, whether or not he is amenable, the essential factor
seems to be a "veto power" 42 the relinquishment of which at death
constitutes the taxable event. The Court made no mention of a veto
power, but stated that the inquiry is whether "a transfer, complete
when made, shall be deemed complete only at the transferor's death," _48
and held the provision in question reasonably necessary to prevent tax
avoidance.44 Even if the transfer inter vivos was complete when made,
as is a gift in contemplation of death, it is significant that there is no
estate tax liability unless some power is possessed by the decedent at his
death.
The statutory provision 45 that the subsections relating to transfers
inter vivas shall apply whether the original transfer was made before
or after the enactment of the statute in effect at the decedent's death
may indicate that the taxable event is the transfer inter vivos. That
37 Cf. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 at 30I, 58 S. Ct. 565 (I938). See
note 88, infra.
88 See note 8, supra, paragraph ( 2).
89 A comparable provision in the income tax law taxes the settler on the income
of a trust revocable by the settlor, or "any person not having a substantial adverse interest" or both. 53 Stat. L. 68 (I939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § 166. A beneficiary is
deemed to have such an interest. Savage v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) 82
F. (2d) 92. As to a trustee, see Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 53 S. Ct. 570
(I933).
40 296 U. S. 85, 56 S. Ct. 70 (I935).
41 Ibid., 296 U. S. at 90.
42 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 55 (I937).
43 Helvering v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 at 90, 56 S. Ct. 70
(I935).
44 "A legislative declaration that a status of the taxpayer's creation shall, in the
application of the tax, be deemed the equivalent of another status falling normally within
the scope of the taxing power, if reasonably requisite to prevent evasion, does not take
property without due process." Ibid., 296 U. S. at 90.
45 53 Stat. L. 124 (I939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § Su (h), first enacted
in I924, 43 Stat. L. 305. See historical note, 26 U. S. C. A. (1935), pp. I40-14I.
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conclusion may seem to be fortified by the cases denying "retroactive
application" in certain instances, but these cases are not at all consistent
and it appears that the limits on "retroactive application" may be traced
to the statutory provision itself. The provision was introduced in the
1918 act and was confined until 1924 to transfers in contemplation of
or talcing effect at death.40 The courts made the limited nature of the
provision a basis for denying "retroactive application" of the l 9 l 6
act 47 and other subsections of the l 9 I 8 act. 48
The leading case denying "retroactive application" is Nichols v.
Coolidge,4° where the Constitution was deemed to prohibit inclusion
of property transferred in 1907 with a reservation of income for life.
The reserved interest, however, was relinquished prior to death, and
although the Court made no point of that fact, it can hardly be overlooked. Moreov~r, in May v. Heiner/ 0 a transfer with a similar reservation made after I 9 I 6 was likewise held not to be a transfer taking
effect in possession or enjoyment at death. The statutory provision
specifically embracing such transfers 61 was upheld in Helve-ring v.
B-ullard,62 and in Hassett v. Welch 53 it was deemed to have no "retroactive" effect both as a matter of statutory interpretation and because
a treasury department ruling to that effect apparently met the approval
of Congress.54 The other leading cases denying "retroactive application,"
Helvering v. Helmholz, 55 White v. Poor,5 6 and Bingham v. United
States 51 were also decided on more than one ground. The recent decision in United States v. Jacobs 58 that property held in a joint tenancy
created prior to 1916 may be included in the gross estate casts considerable doubt upon the materiality of the date of the transfer inter
vivos. 59
40 Stat. L. 1097 (1919); 42 Stat. L. 278 ,(1921).
Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529 at 536, 42 S. Ct. 391 (1922), gift in contemplation of death; Knox v. McElligott, 258 U. S. 546, 42 S. Ct. 396 (1922), joint
tenancy.
48 Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238 at 252, 45 S. Ct. 487 (1925).
49 274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927).
GO 281 u. s. 238, 50 s. Ct. 286 (1930).
51 See note 8, supra, paragraph ( l).
52 303 U.S. 297, 58 S. Ct. 565 (1938).
53 303 U.S. 303, 58 S. Ct. 559 (1938).
54 Ibid., 303 U. S. at 310-313.
55 296 U.S. 93, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
56 296 U.S. 98, 56 S. Ct. 66 (1935).
51 296 u. s. 2II, 56 s. Ct. 180 (1935).
58 306 U.S. 363, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939).
59 '<Neither the amount of the ta.'\: nor its application to the survivor's change of
status and ownership, was in any manner dependent upon the date of the joint ten46
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In general, it appears that the basis for including property transferred by decedent during his lifetime is the extinguishment at his
death of some reserved interest in the property. 60 The interest is generally of one of two types: (I) powers giving control over the disposition of the property, e.g., the power to revoke, modify or appoint;
and (2) rights giving some definite interest in the property-the right
of a joint tenant, a life tenant or a reversioner. Transfers creating the
latter type of interests have two significant characteristics. They are
''beyond recall" and they "split up the fee." The value of such interests
rests in part upon the life expectancy of the donor and, also, in some
cases, the life expectancy of the donee. The ratio of their value to the
value of the "fee" is not constant and in most instances will decline as
the years pass.61 As a general rule their value does not approximate
the value of the "fee" as does the value of powers which give control
over disposition. The estate tax law, however, makes no distinction.
When either type is present at death the value of the entire "fee" is
included in the gross estate. 02
The Supreme Court has required a transfer at death and then
defined transfer broadly-"the shifting of economic benefits" 63-so
as to include the mere relinquishment or extinguishment of a power
or right. There has been a definite tendency to find a taxable transfer as
to the whole property when the final interest therein is surrendered
although the bulk of economic benefit may have passed beyond recall at
some previous time. This result may be due in part to the fact that in
all the leading cases the transfer inter vivos, while without consideraancy's creation, whether before, or after, 1916." United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S.
363 at 371, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939). See also Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308
U.S. 39 at 43, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939).
60 It is not enough that the decedent caused a transfer from one party to another
to be conditional upon his death. The proceeds of insurance policies as to which the
decedent retained no incidents of ownership are not included in his ta.,;:able estate
:tlthough they are paid at his death. Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211, 56
S. Ct. 180 (1935). The income beneficiary of some of the trusts held non-taxable in
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929), changed at the
death of the settler.
61 The proportionate value of a life interest naturally declines. As to a right of
survivorship, the donor in the majority of cases at least has the shorter life expectancy,
and the probability of his being the survivor decreases as time passes.
62
TREAS. REG. 80, art. 15 (1938). See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363
at 371, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939), where all of a severable joint tenancy was included.
63
" • • • the essence of a transfer is the passage of control over the economic benefits of property rather than any technical changes in its title." Sanford's Estate v.
Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 at 43, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939).
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tion, appears to have occurred when there was no gift tax law.°~ The
reservation of interests would not seem to be so important where the
transfer inter vivas was subject to gift tax (in force from r924 to r926,
and from r932 to· date 65 ) because "An important, if not the main
purpose of the gift tax was to prevent or compensate for avoidance of
death taxes.•••" 68 However, the same ·emphasis on reserved interests
is developing in the gift tax. This tax is also a transfer tax,67 and Congress in enacting the law is considered to have adopt,ed "the concept
of a transfer, so painfully developed in respect of taxes on estates." 68
In Burnet v. Guggenheim,69 the relinquishment inter vivos of a
power to · revoke ( which relinquishment left the grantor with no
further interest in the property) was, in accordance with the treasury department regulations,70 held to be a taxable gift because "a
gift is not consummate until put beyond recall." 71 More recently,
in Sanford's Estate v. Convmissioner,12 it was held, perhaps contrary to
8 ¾ One of the five cases (No. 183) considered in the Hallock case occurred during
1925 when a gift tax was in force. Helvering v. Hallock, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct.
444at 449•
65 June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. L. 313-316. Held invalid as to bona fide gifts not in
contemplation of death and completed p;-ior to approval of act. Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U. S. 142, 48 S. Ct. 105 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48
S. Ct. 353 (1928). The statute was held valid as to gifts completed after approval of
act. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 S. Ct. 46 (1929). It was repealed
Feb. 26, 1926, 44 Stat. L. 125 at 126, but reenacted June 6, 1932, 47 Stat. L.
245-259, and amended: May IO, 1934, 48 Stat. L. 758-762; Aug. 30, 1935, 49
Stat. L. 1023-1025; May 28, 1938, 52 Stat. L. 565, 583. It has now been superseded
by the act of Feb: 10, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 144-157, 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), §§10001031. As to the advantages of transferring part of a prospective estate by gift, due to the
lower rates of the gift taxes, the double use of exemptions and the lower brackets, etc.,
and the disadvantages thereof, see MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES oN ESTATES, TRUSTS
AND G1FTS, 1938-39, PP· 423-437 (1938).
66 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 at 44, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939).
It may be noted that during the six-year period (1926 to 1932) in ,vhich there was
no gift tax, the estate tax contained a conclusive presumption as to gifts in contemplation of death. See Hesslein v. Hoey, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 954 at 956.
61 53 Stat. L. 144 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1939), § 1000. See also note 65,
supra.
68 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 at 287, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
69 288 U. S. 280, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
70 Ibid., 288 U.S. at 283, quoting TREAS. REG. 67, art. l (1924).
71 Ibid., 288 U. S. at 286.
12 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939). See also Hesslein v. Hoey, (C. C. A.
2d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 954, cert. denied 302 U.S. 756, 58 S. Ct. 284 (1937). As to
tax on the income of such a trust, see Knapp v. Hoey, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 99.
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the then existing regulations,73 that the relinquishment inter vivas of
a power to modify or appoint constituted a taxable gift. The Supreme
Court stated that there is nothing apparent in the gift tax law or its
legislative history to indicate that "the test of the completeness of the
taxed gift was to be any different from that to be applied in determining
whether the donor has retained an interest such that it becomes subject
to the estate tax upon its extinguishment at death." 14 This principle
seems unobjectionable if the word "complete" means without a reservation giving control over disposition-the type of reservation found
in the Reinecke, Porter, Guggenheim and Sanford cases-but "complete" may mean without any reservations whatsoever. The above quoted
words were written by Justice Stone, whose statement in the dissenting
opinion in the St. Louis Trust case,75 that a reversion conditioned upon
surviving the donee leaves a transfer incomplete, was quoted approvingly in the majority opinion of the Hallock case.76 If these statements,
which are to some extent dictum, can be taken to mean that there is no
gift tax liability on a transfer with a conditional reversion, the application of the gift tax law would seem to face some substantial changes.
The courts have disapproved of subjecting the same property to
gift tax at two different times 77 or to both estate and gift tax. An
exception is admitted in the case of gifts in contemplation of death.78
There may be other instances. The present gift tax regulations provide that there is some liability upon the creation of (r) a joint ten78 TREAs. REG. 67, art. I (1924), under the 1924 act and Trum. REG. 79, art.
3 (1932) under the 1932 act, stated that there was a gift when a power to revoke
is terminated. In the Sanford case the donor had previously relinquished the power to
revoke, but retained the power to appoint. Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308
U.S. 39 at 41, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939). The decision that gift tax liability arose upon
the surrender of the final right in the property is significant and the regulations
probably were intended to cover situations in which the relinquishment of the power
to revoke left the donor with no interest in the property. The regulations have been
amended. TREAS. REG. 79 (1936 ed.), art. 3.
14 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 at 44, 60 S. Ct. SI (1939),
75 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 at 46-47, 56 S. Ct. 74
(1935).
76
Helvering v. Hallock, (U.S. 1940) 60- S. Ct. 444 at 449.
71 "Congress did not mean that the tax should be paid nvice, or partly at one
time and partly at another. If a revocable deed of trust is a present transfer by gift,
there is not another transfer when the power is extinguished. If there is not a present
transfer upon the delivery of the revocable deed, then there is such a transfer upon
the extinguishment of the power." Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 at 285,
53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
78
Hesslein v. Haey, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 954 at 956.
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ancy,7° (2) a life interest in another 80 (leaving the donor a reversion),
and (3) a vested remainder 81 ( leaving the donor a life interest),
although it has been well settled for some years that the entire "fee"
is included in the gross estate if the donor retains the respective reserved interest until death.82 The gift tax liability in such cases, however, is not measured by the value of the entire "fee" but by the value
of the right actually transferred,83 and the relinquishment inter
vivas of the interest reserved is likewise considered to result in gift
tax liability, measured probably by the then value of that interest.84
It is significant that the reserved interests in these situations do not
give control over disposition. The type of interests involved in the
Hallock case, and possibly in the City Bank case,8 G are essentially of the
same class, and it is submitted that they should be accorded similar
treatment for gift tax purposes, whatever finally that may prove to be.
Because of the manner in which the tax is measured, there is nothing
unfair in the present method of taxing both the original transfer and
the relinquishment inter vivos. "Double taxation" results only when
the relinquishment is caused by death.
When property as to which a gift tax has been paid is included
in the gross estate, the estate tax law allows a credit for gift taxes paid,86
but that credit does not afford a full measure of relief. The property
is included at the value of the date of death and not the value at the
date of gj.ft, but the credit is computed on the basis of the lower of the
two values and the average estate tax on the entire gross estate. It is
further limited by the affected property's pro rata share of the gift tax
paid for the year of the gift. In contrast, however, the inclusion of the
property in the gross estate causes higher rates to be applied to some of
79 TREAS. REG. 79, art. 2 (7), (8) (1936 ed.).
so Ibid., art. 19 (7).
81 Ibid., art. 1 I.
82 Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930), joint tenancy;
Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398 (1931), reversion; 46 Stat. L.
1516 (1931), and note 8, supra, paragraphs (1) (2), life estate.
83 Trow. REG. 79, art. 19 (7), (8) (1936 ed.). Cf. J.C. Gutman v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. No. 108 (Apr. II, 1940).
8 "' The portion of the "fee" taxed at relinquishment would probably vary from
the portion not taxed at the original transfer, because the values would depend to some
extent upon life expectancies. See TREAS. REG. 79, art. 19 (7), (8) (1936 ed.); and
note 61, supra.
85 A transfer in trust revocable by the settlor and a beneficiary might be held a
taxable gift to the extent of the beneficiary's interests. See, generally, MoNTGOMERY,
FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND G1FTS, 1938-39, PP· 386-387 (1938).
86 53 Stat. L. 125, 142-143 (1939), 26 U.S. C. A. (1939), §§ 813 (a), 936(b).
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the estate and its inclusion as a gift will result in higher rates being
applied to any gifts made in subsequent years. Even if the credit gave
a full measure of relief it would not justify the estate tax's identical
treatment of the two classes of reserved interests. A transfer in which
control is not reserved is substantially less testamentary in character
than a transfer in which control is reserved. The transferor who
reserves a life estate or a right of survivorship does not have the essential control over disposition possessed by the man who has made his
will or last testament or the donor who may recall his gift or appoint
a new donee.
On the other hand, a transfer reserving a right terminable at death
should not be treated the same as a transfer without any reservation.
Inasmuch as what is being taxed is not the transfer inter vivas but the
relinquishment at death, it would seem reasonable to take into account
in some way the value of the interest reserved until death. The estate
tax cannot reasonably include such rights at their value at death because
by their nature they would have little or no value at that time. Everything considered, there would seem to be realistic basis for a provision
that in case a person dies possessed of powers or rights as to property
transferred by him inter vivas, his gross estate shall include that fraction of the value of the "fee" which was not subject to a gift tax, the
fraction of value not subject to gift tax to be determined on the basis of
the value at the date of the gift and applied for estate tax purposes to
the value at the date of death.87 By some such provision the amount included in the gross estate because of a reservation in a transfer inter
vivos would be reasonably related to the nature of the interest reserved.
Such a provision would eliminate the need for a credit for gift
taxes paid except in the case of gifts in contemplation of death. The
purpose of including such transfers might be accomplished with much
less administrative difficulty by providing that property donated in the
calender year of death, and perhaps if death _occurred prior to, say
March rst, that donated in the preceding calender year, shall not be
subject to gift tax, but shall be included in the gross estate. Such a
provision would affect only gifts now reportable after the donor's
death. Some strong arguments might be made for its validity if it is not
87 The determination of the fraction of value not subject to gift tax is essentially
the same type of computation now required in determining gift tax liability in the
case of joint tenancies, life interests and remainders. TREAS. REG. 79, art. I9 (I932).
It would seem desirable to determine this fraction of value before any exclusions or
exemptions.
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expressed in terms of a conclusive presumption and if the donated
property is included at the value at the time of the gift.88
So far as concerns transfers with a reservation of rights, the estate
tax is, in large measure at least, a tax on relinquishments mainly as a result of e:fforts to prevent tax avoidance during a period when only the
relinquishment could be taxed. The development of the gift tax in
the same direction may have revenue benefits if the original transfer
was not and cannot be subjected to tax, but the number of such instances naturally will decrease and the real result will be to postpone
the taxable event beyond the time when the bulk of economic benefit
is transferred. It is now and has been for several years possible to tax
the original transfer, as well as the relinquishment, and it would seem
reasonable to tax the original transfer to the extent that it constitutes a
surrender of control and to tax the balance at the relinquishment of
the reserved right. This may increase the relative importance of the
gift tax, but only because the estate tax has been over-emphasized in the
past. There is no longer any necessity for taxing the whole property
when the final right therein is surrendered. Regardless of whether the
estate and gift taxes remain separate systems or are integrated in a
single system (with the taxrate brackets for transfers at death dependent upon the amount of accumulated gifts),89 it would seem reasonable
for Congress and, where possible, for the courts to give "transfer'' a
more balanced meaning than that so painfully developed, in respect of
taxes on estates, during a period when death was the only occasion for
the assessment of a transfer tax.
88 Some support may be found in Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 at 301,
58 S. Ct. 565 (1938): "Since Congress may lay an excise upon gifts it is of no
significance that the exaction is denominated an estate tax or is found in a statute purporting to levy an estate tax. Moreover, Congress having the right to classify gifts of
different sorts might impose an excise at one rate upon a gift without reservation of
a life estate and at another rate upon a gift with such reservation." See Knouff,
''Death Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivos," 36 M1cH, L. REV. 1284 at
1303-13n (1938), As to the use of the value at the date of death, see Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 at 330, 52 S. Ct. 358 (1932). The statement in the Enllard
cru;e may or may not apply where the basis for classification is an event occurring
between the date of the gift and the day on which the tax is due. A somewhat similar
situation is found in regard to the income tax. 53 Stat. L. 17, 26 U. S. C. (1939), §
24 (c).
89 See Knouff, ''Death Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivos," 36 M1cH,
L. REv. 1284 at 13n (1938).

